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I. Introduction 
 
This Article addresses the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in the United States, with particular 
attention to the recent decisions in Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,1 in which the heirs of the 
creator of the Betty Boop character were prevented from enforcing the marks in the image and name 
of the character, due in part to claims of aesthetic functionality. A doctrine that many thought was 
largely banished by the courts, aesthetic functionality has recently reemerged front and center in the 
trademark litigation landscape. Notably, in the past three years, courts issued several decisions 
addressing claims of aesthetic functionality raised by defendants or the courts themselves. Not 
surprisingly, these decisions sparked a rush of opposition among trademark owners and trademark 
practitioners. In particular, as a result of these decisions, practitioners started to elaborate lengthy lists 
of precautionary measures for trademark owners to avoid the “zombie apocalypse” that the revival of 
aesthetic functionality could otherwise entail— the impossibility to enforce their marks, or even the 
marks’ cancellation.2 Still, while suggesting strategies for trademark owners to follow in order to erect 
barriers against future strikes of the doctrine, trademark practitioners did not seem to address, or even 
to investigate, the reasons that could have caused the recent resurrection of aesthetic functionality in 
the first place. Similarly, while blaming the courts for attacking “their trademarks,” trademark owners 
did not seem to wonder why the judiciary had suddenly returned to resorting aesthetic functionality, at 
times spontaneously. Hence, a closer look at the developments that have characterized trademark law 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore; Fellow, Transatlantic Technology Law Forum, Stanford Law School. I thank Rebecca Tushnet for reading this 
Article and providing insightful suggestions. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a CLE workshop at the 
Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore in March 2013. I thank all the participants for their thoughtful 
comments and conversation on the topic. I also thank Heather Stutz for research assistance. The views expressed and any 
mistakes remain my own.  
1 See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn by Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. 
A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 
2008); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. 
A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Due to the limited scope of this Article, I do not comprehensively 
elaborate on the theoretical issues, and practical problems, that (still) affect the application of the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality in the United States. For a general overview and critique of the doctrine, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death 
of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1999); Annette Kur, Too Pretty To 
Protect? Trade Mark Law and The Enigma of Aesthetic Functionality, in TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION: CONTRIBUTION IN 
HONOUR OF HANNS ULLRICH, 139 (Josef Drexl et al. eds. 2009) (addressing the doctrine both in the United States and in 
Europe); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:81 (2013). 
2 See B. Brett Heavner, Trademark Aesthetic Functionality: A Zombie Apocalypse?, 85 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 
(BNA) 196 (2012). 
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and trademark practice in the recent decades seems to easily explain the reasons behind the judicial 
resurrection of the doctrine in the United States.  
 
Notably, as the scope of trademark protection has relentlessly expanded in the past several decades, 
the business world has frequently resorted to trademark law to attempt to claim exclusive rights in a 
growing list of product features, including colors, shapes, smells, gestures, and so on, based on the 
assertion that these features are capable of distinguishing products in the market and, as a result, 
should be protected as trademarks.3 These claims, however, have often been met with controversy, 
particularly by the courts.  As I highlight in this Article, courts in the United States may thus have 
resorted to aesthetic functionality, at least in part, to counter the trend of expansive trademark 
protection and potentially overreaching trademark claims.4 In particular, courts may have turned to 
this doctrine to prevent granting trademark rights (and potentially perpetual monopolies) in important 
product features that could put competitors at a significant “non-reputation-related”5 disadvantage 
with respect to non-technical (non-utilitarian) product aspects—such as product styles, presentation, 
packaging, and aesthetic appearance—which are nonetheless fundamental to compete in today’s 
economy. Still, the recent decisions in Fleischer added an important element to this analysis, namely 
the fact that the courts likely resorted to aesthetic functionality to counter the consequences resulting 
from the growing practice of using trademark law as an additional form of protection for copyrighted, 
or once copyrighted, creative works. As the Ninth Circuit initially stated it in Fleischer (even though 
the court later retracted its words), to grant trademark rights in creative works would essentially imply 
that these works would “never enter the public domain”6 in breach of the societal bargain that 
originally justifies copyright protection in these works.7  In this Article, after a brief overview of the 
history and developments of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, I examine the Fleischer decisions 
and address their impact, particularly with respect to the possibility to resort to trademark protection 
for works protected, or once protected, under copyright law in the future. 
 
 
II. A Brief Primer on Aesthetic Functionality 
 
The doctrine of aesthetic functionality originates from a comment in the 1938 Restatement of Torts 
according to which product features may be functional “when goods are bought largely for their 
aesthetic value.”8 In 1952, the Ninth Circuit famously applied this definition in Pagliero v. Wallace 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 
U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992); In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions, 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998); Frederick Warne & 
Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 482 F.Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990). See 
also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687 (1999). 
4 See Mark McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 824 (2012) (offering a detailed reconstruction of the 
doctrine and advocating for a broader application). 
5 TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).  
6 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (U.S. 2003)). 
7 Copyright law in the United States derives its authority from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, in which 
Congress shall have the power “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). In 
contrast, trademark law derives its authority from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which provides that Congress 
shall have power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
8 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, cmt. a (1938). 
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China Co.9 Pagliero, a china manufacturer and longtime competitor of Wallace, copied four 
distinctive china patterns from Wallace. Wallace sued Pagliero, but the Ninth Circuit denied the claim 
because it found that the patterns were aesthetically functional and thus not protectable.  More 
generally, the court stated that when “[a] particular feature is an important ingredient in the 
commercial success of a product, the interest of free competition permits its imitation in the absence 
of a patent and copyright.”10  The court also distinguished aesthetically functional features (that could 
be copied by competitors) from features that were “mere arbitrary embellishment[s] … [which are] 
primarily adopted for purposes of identification … [and are] unrelated to basic consumer demands in 
connection with the product.” For the latter, the court accepted that “imitation may be forbidden.”11  
Not surprisingly, the Pagliero decision and its application of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality 
were met with skepticism. In particular, the doctrine was criticized because it paradoxically seemed to 
penalize “successful designs,” which could be freely copied, against aesthetically unappealing ones, 
which could be protected as trademarks.12 The doctrine was also criticized because it was essentially, 
and problematically, transforming the judiciary into arbiters of products’ aesthetic appeal. As a result 
of the doctrine, the judiciary was asked to ultimately decide what was too pretty to be protected.13 
 
Likely because of this skepticism, aesthetic functionality was not meaningfully invoked, after 
Pagliero, for almost three decades. Then, in 1980, the Ninth Circuit resurrected it in International 
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,14 where the court held that the unauthorized 
manufacture and sale of jewelry bearing a fraternity insignia was permitted because the insignia was 
used as a functionally aesthetic component of the jewelry and not as a trademark. Specifically, the 
court stated that “[t]rademark law does not prevent a person from copying so-called functional 
features of a product which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as 
distinguished from assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.”15  
Immediately, the decision was met with fear by various industries that saw in the ruling a potential 
death sentence against the possibility of developing (highly lucrative) licensing and merchandising 
practices. Perhaps due to intense lobbying by trademark owners, just one year later, however, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed course and drastically limited the doctrine in Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young 
Enterprises.16 Here, the court explicitly denied that defendant’s copying of the famous LV logo could 
be justified under a claim of aesthetic functionality. Against defendant’s argument that the LV mark 
was the reason why consumers purchased the product (similar to Job’s Daughters), the court specified 
that this did not override the fact that the LV mark was still used to identify the source of products, 
and thus copying it amounted to trademark infringement.17 Louis Vuitton and the owners of other 
famous marks certainly felt more comfortable after this ruling, which seemed to clarify that famous 
marks were not going to be held functional just because consumers may purchase these products 
                                                          
9 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.1952). 
10 Id. at 343. 
11 Id. 
12 For a detailed review of the decision, see Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 691.  
13 See Kur, supra note 1, at 139.  
14 International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980). 
15 Id. at 917 (“[i]t is not uncommon for a name or emblem that serves in one context as a collective mark or trademark also 
to be merchandised for its own utility to consumers.”). 
16 Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981). 
17 Id. at 774-75.  
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primarily (if not only) because of the marks that are affixed to (and decorate) the products. After 
Vuitton, the doctrine seemed to become dormant and when the Ninth Circuit again was faced with it 
in 2001’s Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., the court even dismissed having resorted to it in 
the past.18 
 
In the meantime, other courts resorted to the aesthetic functionality,19 including the Second Circuit, 
which interpreted the doctrine narrowly compared to the Ninth Circuit. Specifically, the Second 
Circuit embraced aesthetic functionality in 1991’s Wallace International v. Godinger,20 where the 
court denied the plaintiff, a seller of high-end silverware under the name Grand Baroque, relief 
against the defendant’s use of a similar style for its (not high-end) silverware under the name 20th 
Century Baroque. In that case, the court affirmed that Wallace’s silverware was “functional” and 
therefore not eligible for protection under the Lanham Act because granting protection to Wallace’s 
silverware would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of alternative designs to 
competitors.21 Notably, the court emphasized that Wallace was seeking protection for the “basic 
elements of a decorative style” and not for a particular and distinctive expression of it.22 A few years 
later, the Second Circuit again adopted the same test in 1993’s Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke 
K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., a case with facts similar to Pagliero.23  The court, however, did not find that 
the chinaware patterns in question were functional this time and granted trademark protection to the 
patterns. Perhaps because of the different approaches followed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, or 
simply because of the relevance of aesthetic product features for market competition, the Supreme 
Court also considered the impact of trademark protection for aesthetic features as part of the Court’s 
analysis of the issue of functionality in trademark law in general.  
 
In particular, in 1995’s Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,24 the Supreme Court articulated a 
definition of “aesthetic value” and “functionality.” Starting from the definition of the 1993 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,25 the Court underlined that “[t]he functionality doctrine 
… forbids the use of a product’s feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at 
significant disadvantage because the feature is ‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or 
‘affects [its] cost or quality of the article.’”26 The Court also said that “[t]he functionality doctrine [] 
protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to the recognition or reputation) that trademark 
protection … imposes[s], namely their inability to reasonably replicate important non-reputation-
related features.”27 Six years later, in 2001, the Court returned to the issue in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
                                                          
18 Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc. 251 F.3d 1252, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 2001) (“this circuit has [not] adopted the 
‘aesthetic functionality’ theory, that is, the notion that a purely aesthetic feature can be functional.”). 
19 Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 
(S.D. Iowa 1982), aff’d, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983). 
20 Wallace Int’l Silversmith v. Godinger Silver Art, 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990). 
21 Id. at 82.  
22 Id. at 81 (holding that Wallace could have exclusivity on a precise expression of the baroque style upon a showing of 
secondary meaning). 
23 Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1993).  
24 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
25 Id. at 170 (“if a design’s ‘aesthetic value’ lies in the ability to ‘confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be 
duplicated by the use of alternative designs,’ then the design is ‘functional.’”). 
26 Id. at 169.  
27 Id.  
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Marketing Displays, Inc.28 In this case, recalling its opinion in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives 
Laboratories, Inc.,29 the Court clarified the test for utilitarian and aesthetic functionality. In particular, 
the Court first specified that a feature would fit the utilitarian functionality test “if it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”30 Should a feature not be 
functional under this test, the Court stated that it could still be aesthetically functional if the 
“exclusive use of [the feature] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”31 Post-TrafFix, courts turned primarily to this test when considering claims of aesthetic 
functionality, even though ambiguity remained, and remains, as to what precisely constitutes, in 
practice, a “non-reputation-related disadvantage.”32 Notably, in 2006, the Ninth Circuit followed this 
test in Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen33 to conclude that the use of famous marks on promotional 
products was not aesthetically functional because the marks in question were still used to indicate 
commercial source, at least at-large.34 
 
After Au-Tomotive Gold, the doctrine again became dormant and seemed to have lost its relevance 
altogether.35 But, in 2010, the Seventh Circuit found that a trademark in a round beach towel was 
invalid under the TrafFix test in Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek.36 In his opinion, Judge 
Easterbrook not only endorsed aesthetic functionality but also added that fashion “is a form of 
function” and “[a] design’s aesthetic appeal can be as functional as its tangible characteristics.”37  
Similarly, in 2011, the District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the color red, 
as applied to the outsole of women’s shoes, was aesthetically functional in Christian Louboutin S.A. v. 
Yves Saint-Laurent America Holding, Inc.38 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding the ruling 
contrary to Qualitex, which held that colors could be trademarks.39 The decision was nonetheless a 
victory for the defendant because the court ruled that the mark was valid only when used as a contrast 
mark. In other words, Louboutin’s red outsoles were protected only when used with respect to black 
or other colored shoes, while Yves Saint-Laurent remained free to produce entirely red shoes, 
including red outsoles.40  In 2012, the same District Court in New York rejected Guess’ claim that 
Gucci’s “Diamond Motif” was aesthetically functional in Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, Inc.,41 but 
Guess appealed and an appeal is pending on that case (in the meantime, Gucci received bad news 
                                                          
28 TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).  
29 Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).  
30 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32.  
31 Id. 
32 See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir.2004). 
33 Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). 
34 Id. at 1074.  
35 See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F. 2d 1235 (6th Cir. 2004); Devan Designs, Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (M.D.N.C. 1992). 
36 Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010). 
37 Id. at 860.  
38 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
39 Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2012). 
40 Id. at 227-28 (not offering, however, a complete analysis of the claim of aesthetic functionality).  
41 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
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from a similar dispute in Italy).42 Still in 2012, the Sixth Circuit also addressed aesthetic functionality, 
but found that the dripping wax seal applied to Maker’s Mark bourbon bottles was not aesthetically 
functional in Maker’s Mark Distillery v. Diageo North America.43 Back to the West Coast, the District 
Court for the Central District of California also resorted to aesthetic functionality in 2011’s Mattel, 
Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., where the court found that the Bratz doll packaging was 
aesthetically functional and thus should not be protected.44 As I elaborate below, the same court ruled 
in 2011 and 2012 that the image and name of the Betty Boop character were aesthetically functional 
in the Fleischer decisions. The Ninth Circuit also had its say on this case, adding an important 
element to the interpretation of aesthetic functionality in the United States. 
 
 
III. Oh My! The Thrills and Chills of the Betty Boop Judicial Play 
 
2011 and 2012 were busy years for the Betty Boop character, who performed the leading role in a 
litigation play that brought about many fears among trademark owners. Courts in California were the 
forum for this play, which will certainly have relevant implications in the future with respect to the 
scope of trademark protection for works protected, or once protected, by copyright. To briefly 
summarize the dispute, cartoonist Max Fleisher created the character of Betty Boop in the 1930s.45 A 
decade later, Fleischer sold his rights to the character and dissolved his company.46 In the early 1970s, 
Max Fleischer’s family revived the Fleischer cartoon business and reasserted ownership in the 
character of Betty Boop, even though the chain of title to the copyright in the character remained 
fractioned, and Fleischer could not assert clear copyright ownership on it.47 Fleischer additionally 
submitted applications to federally register as trademarks the image and name of the Betty Boop 
character and started to license the character to third parties for use in connection with toys, dolls, and 
so forth.48 Meanwhile, A.V.E.L.A., an independent poster company, also used the character of Betty 
Boop on posters, dolls, and apparel, but without seeking authorization from Fleischer. A.V.E.L.A.’s 
merchandise incorporated elements (including images and the words Betty Boop) from vintage Betty 
Boop movie posters that A.V.E.L.A. had restored and believed to be in the public domain. Fleischer 
opposed A.V.E.L.A.’s use of the Betty Boop character, and, based on the fact that A.V.E.L.A.’s 
merchandise was not authorized, pled claims for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and 
several related state law claims against A.V.E.L.A. in front of the District Court of the Central District 
of California. 
 
The District Court, however, denied Fleischer’s claims and granted summary judgment to 
A.V.E.L.A., holding that Fleischer held neither a valid copyright nor a valid trademark in the 
                                                          
42 On May 2, 2013, the Milan Court of First Instance dismissed Gucci’s claims against Guess for trademark infringement in 
Italy. See Eleonora Rosati, Milan Court of First Instance Rules in Favour of Guess in the Gucci/Guess Saga, THE IPKAT 
BLOG (May 8, 2013) http://ipkitten.blogspot.sg/2013/05/milan-court-of-first-instance-rules-in.html. 
43 Maker’s Mark Distillery v. Diageo North America, 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012).  
44 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc. & Consol. Actions, 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
45 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011). 
46 Id. at 1117-1118. 
47 Id. at 1118. 
48 Id.   
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character.49  With respect to the copyright claim, the court noted, in particular, that Fleischer was 
unable to establish a clear chain of title transferring the original copyright in the character back to 
Fleischer. Accordingly, the court rejected the copyright claim in the absence of evidence that 
Fleischer was the legitimate copyright owner.50 The court also argued that Fleischer failed to 
adequately document the trademark rights that Fleischer supposedly had in the Betty Boop character 
and name. Notably, on one side, the court held that Fleischer failed to submit proper evidence that it 
had a registered federal trademark in the Betty Boop image (which Fleischer failed to place in the 
record).51  On the other side, with respect to the Betty Boop word mark, the court noted that, while 
Fleischer did include the registration in the record, Fleischer still failed to provide evidence that the 
mark had become incontestable, which in turn the court used as grounds to deny that the mark had 
achieved secondary meaning.52 Finally, the court held that Fleischer had not established that it owned 
common-law trademarks in Betty Boop’s name or image.53 In summary, the court declared a full-
fledged victory for A.V.E.L.A. Fleisher then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.54 
 
In what would later become known as Fleischer I, the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the lower 
court’s decision in its entirety. First, the court affirmed the rejection of the copyright claim based 
upon the fractured chain of title.55 Second, the court affirmed the rejection of the trademark claims.56 
Yet, the court added a highly controversial twist that immediately hit trademark owners like an 
earthquake—namely, the court resorted, spontaneously, to the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and 
invoked nothing less than its (terrorizing) decision in Job’s Daughters57 that everyone thought had 
long been forgotten. In particular, based on the lack of evidence that consumers had actually inferred 
a connection between Fleischer’s and A.V.E.L.A.’s products, the Ninth Circuit held that A.V.E.L.A. 
was not using the Betty Boop image and name as trademarks. To the contrary, the court held that 
A.V.E.L.A. was using the image and name “as a functional product” or “functional aesthetic 
components” that did not have a source-identifying purpose and thus could not be protected.58 If this 
was not enough to despair trademark owners, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to reference a second case 
not cited by the parties—the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp.59—this time to limit the effects of the practice of claiming trademark rights in creative 
works once copyright protection had expired (or was not enforceable). In particular, the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that granting trademark rights in the Betty Boop character implied that the “character would 
essentially never enter the public domain,” which “would run directly contrary to Dastar.”60  In 
                                                          
49 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (granting summary judgment to 
A.V.E.L.A. for the copyright claim and reserving ruling for the trademark and unfair competition claims); Fleischer Studios, 
Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment to A.V.E.L.A. for the 
trademark claims). 
50 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1152-1153 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
51 Id. at 1154. 
52 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  
53 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1152-1153 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
54 Fleischer Studios Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). 
55 Id. at 1122.  
56 Id. at 1124-25.  
57 Id. at 1122.  
58 Id. at 1124. 
59 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).   
60 Fleischer Studios Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).  
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Dastar, the Supreme Court held that where a work was in the public domain, a party could not assert a 
trademark claim against an alleged infringer because this would create “a species of mutant copyright 
law that limits the public’s federal right to ‘copy and to use’ expired copyrights.”61 
 
Obviously in disagreement, several trademark owners and trademark lawyers condemned the decision 
for having “misapplied the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, flinging the door wide open for 
infringers and counterfeiters to use valuable logos with impunity.”62 Numerous amicus briefs, 
including from the International Trademark Association, were filed in support of Fleischer’s motion 
for a panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc in the case. Amici contended, in particular, that the Ninth 
Circuit overruled its own precedent in Au-Tomotive Gold and “reincarnated sua sponte the outdated 
and much-criticized aesthetic functionality doctrine [of Job’s Daughters].”63 Amici additionally 
argued that, by invoking Dastar, the court had misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s holding and 
applied it to a case where copyright was not yet expired (even though protection was not enforceable 
due to lack of evidence about copyright ownership).64 Eventually, to the (partial) relief of trademark 
owners and practitioners, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its original opinion and issued a new 
superseding opinion, which became known as Fleischer II.65 This time, the court did not resort to 
aesthetic functionality and did not even mention Job’s Daughters or Dastar.66 Still, the court upheld 
judgment for A.V.E.L.A. on the copyright claim and on the image mark claim.67 Notably, the court 
found in favor of A.V.E.LA. because, as a matter of law, Fleischer had not produced sufficient 
evidence of secondary meaning in the Betty Boop image, and thus the issue was not triable.68 The 
court also found that the fractured ownership history of the word mark Betty Boop was not conclusive 
evidence of lack of secondary meaning and remanded for further proceedings.69 Finally, the court 
vacated and remanded the ruling on the word mark claim. Although not fully satisfied with the ruling, 
trademark owners were at least relieved to have defeated (so they thought) the reappearance of 
aesthetic functionality. 
 
To the dismay of trademark owners, however, the District Court again resurrected aesthetic 
functionality on remand while ruling on the claim for the word mark “Betty Boop.”70 Here again, the 
court ruled that A.V.E.L.A. used the name “Betty Boop” not as a source identifier but as a decorative 
element on its products.71 Furthermore, the court stated that, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit 
abandoned its reliance on the doctrine in Fleischer II, “the reasoning set forth in Fleischer I [was] 
                                                          
61 Id. at 34.  
62 See Charles E. Coleman, A Red-Leather Year for Aesthetic Functionality, 4 No. 2 LANDSLIDE 26, 29 (2011) (quoting Anne 
Gilson LaLonde, Ninth Circuit Misunderstands Aesthetic Functionality, LEXIS NEXIS, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK 
COMMUNITY, Jun. 12, 2011). 
63 See  Brief for the International Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, 
p. 7, Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., No. 09-56317 (2011), available at 
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAFleischerAVELA.pdf. 
64 Id. at 8. 
65 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011).  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 968.  
68 Id. at 967.  
69 Id. at 968. 
70 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
71 Id. at 1074. 
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nevertheless sound and applicable”72 to the case, and thus also in the future.  The court additionally 
reiterated that the holdings in Job’s Daughters and Au-Tomotive Gold were controlling precedents in 
this case. Accordingly, based upon the Au-Tomotive Gold test (from TrafFix), the court held that 
A.V.E.L.A.’s use of the words “Betty Boop” was not functional in the utilitarian sense, yet the mark 
was aesthetically functional because the “protection of the feature as a trademark would impose a 
significant non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage on [A.V.E.L.A.].”73 Namely, the court 
noted that if A.V.E.L.A. was to market its goods bearing the image of Betty Boop or Betty Boop 
movie posters without the possibility to use the words “Betty Boop” to identify the character, “that 
would make their products less marketable than the same product that included the BETTY BOOP 
name.”74 Ultimately, the court was clearly set to find that A.V.E.L.A. should be allowed to use the 
name of the character to identify its products. Indeed, the court added that, should “[d]efendants’ use 
of the mark [not be] aesthetically functional, then it is ‘fair use.’”75 In particular, the court said that 
A.V.E.L.A. could not identify products depicting the character but with the character’s own name—
Betty Boop. Interestingly, Fleischer did not appeal this ruling. 
 
IV. Aesthetic Functionality: A Bitter Medicine Against “Mutant Copyrights”? 
 
Not surprisingly, the decisions in Fleisher deeply concerned trademark owners and trademark 
practitioners across the United States, predicting new attacks from the now fully resurrected doctrine 
of aesthetic functionality. As an immediate reaction, a growing number of professional publications 
started to provide specific strategic advice to trademark owners in order to avoid the dramatic 
consequences of a finding of aesthetic functionality—that is, the loss of their marks—while 
simultaneously voicing criticism against the doctrine that many believed (and hoped) to be extinct and 
that had instead reemerged with full force.76 In these professional publications, practitioners 
ultimately attempted to reassure trademark owners that, “with appropriate planning and care, [they 
should have] no reason to fear a trademark zombie apocalypse.”77 In particular, based upon the 
analysis of the recent decisions, practitioners highlighted the most common missteps that could 
expose trademark owners to claims of aesthetic functionality, and to which trademark owners should 
pay special attention to avoid the loss of their marks. In this respect, practitioners stressed that the 
following missteps could lead to a finding of aesthetic functionality: the failure to properly document 
trademark registrations, the failure to purport the mark as a source identifier (for example, on the 
products or product packaging), the lack of enforcement, and above all the fact that trademark owners 
themselves emphasized the aesthetic character of the mark in advertising or otherwise. To the 
contrary, practitioners emphasized that the safest approach that trademark owners should adopt to 
successfully withstand claims of aesthetic functionality continued, and continues, to be to 
“consistently treat[] trademarks and trade dress as ‘source identifiers’” and “avoid[] statements 
                                                          
72 Id. at 1073.  
73 Id. at 1075. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 See, e.g., Heavner, supra note 2, at 196. For a critical review, see also Tracy Reilly, Betty Boop Almost Lost Her “Bling-
Bling”: Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A. and The Re-Emergence of Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Merchandising 
Cases, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 95 (2012). 
77 Heavner, supra note 2. 
Final Draft for EIPR—November 14, 2013  
10 
 
highlighting a function that would be important to competitors,” besides “carefully document[ing] all 
trademark rights for use in litigation.”78 
 
Unfortunately, however, while developing these “damage control” strategies, trademark practitioners 
did not seem to posit over the causes—the fundamental reasons—that may have triggered the return 
of aesthetic functionality in the trademark litigation landscape in the first instance. Hence, a closer 
look at the developments that have characterized trademark law and practice in the recent decades 
seems to indicate that the judicial revival of the doctrine may be directly connected to (and may 
represent a judicial push-back against) the relentless expansion of the scope of trademark protection.79 
In particular, the analysis of recent decisions invoking the doctrine seems to show that courts remain 
resistant, at large, to awarding trademark protection to basic elements of decorative styles, shapes of 
products or product packaging, basic colors, and so on—despite changes in trademark law now 
permitting such protection. Granting exclusive protection in these features could in fact severely limit 
important aspects of market competition, not with respect to technologically-related features (barred 
from protection under utilitarian functionality), but in terms of current product styles, colors, aesthetic 
appeal, and so on, which nevertheless represent fundamental elements to compete in today’s market 
economy.80 This was most certainly the case in the recent decisions in Jay Franco81 and Mattel,82 and 
partially in Louboutin,83 where the courts prohibited or limited trademark protection on product 
shapes and colors that, if monopolized by trademark owners, could severely impair market 
competition on product features that, albeit non-utilitarianly functional, were still essential to compete 
in the marketplace.  To the contrary, courts seemed less resistant and ultimately did not find that using 
famous marks or established trade dresses to enhance products’ aesthetic appeal amounted to aesthetic 
functionality when the use of these marks could still play an important role as source-indicators for 
consumers.84 This consideration was most likely what “saved” the marks at issue in Gucci America85 
and Maker’s Mark Distillery,86 where the courts found that the marks were not functional because 
they still served a source-identifying function for consumers.87 
 
Yet, the Fleischer decisions undoubtedly added, first explicitly and then implicitly, an unprecedented 
twist to the judicial interpretation of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. In particular, concerns 
over market competition in aesthetically-related features did not seem to be the only reason that drove 
                                                          
78 Id. 
79 See supra note 3. 
80 See discussion and references supra Part II. See also McKenna, supra note 4, at 853 (stressing that “the point of aesthetic 
functionality is to capture cases in which the need for a feature is dictated by market expectations rather than engineering 
problems.”). 
81 Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010). 
82 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc. & Consol. Actions, 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
83 Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
84 See McKenna, supra note 4, at 853-58 (advocating for a more nuanced approach to findings of aesthetic functionality to 
include cases where “the feature at issue might indicate to consumers something about source.”). 
85 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
86 Maker’s Mark Distillery v. Diageo North America, 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012). 
87 See Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen 457 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that claims of aesthetic functionality 
would be successful for features “that serve an aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function”). 
Courts thus confirmed that marks can be used to identify promotional products even when consumers purchase these 
products primarily because of the mark. See also Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark 
Merchandising, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 865 (2011). 
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the courts to resort to the doctrine in order to declare that the image and name of Betty Boop could be 
freely used by A.V.E.L.A. Instead, the courts seemed to invoke the doctrine (also, if not primarily) to 
counter the negative effects that would otherwise result from the possibility of protecting the Betty 
Boop character (her name and image) also as a trademark, in addition to the protection already 
granted to the character (and no longer applicable) under copyright law.88  In this respect, the (pre-
litigation) story of Betty Boop is not unique. An increasingly common trend in the business world, 
copyright owners frequently turn to overlapping copyright and trademark protection for their works to 
enjoy double protection (as copyrights and trademarks) during the copyright term or to maintain 
exclusive rights in the works as trademarks once the copyright has expired.89  Even though creative 
works often qualify for trademark protection because they can be considered distinctive, and thus 
capable of identifying products in the marketplace, extending such protection to these works remains 
nonetheless problematic. This additional layer of protection may in fact directly interfere with the 
public’s exploitation of the work during or after the duration of copyright protection and, as a result, 
negatively affect the copyright bargain upon which copyright protection is granted in the first place 
(to characters and any other creative works). In particular, concurrent overlapping trademark 
protection during the copyright term may restrict the scope of copyright fair use and prevent the 
creation of independent works (which are legitimate works under copyright law even while possibly 
being infringements under trademark law).90 Even more problematically, sequential trademark 
protection after the expiration of the copyright term may ultimately prevent creative works from 
entering the public domain altogether, which directly forecloses public access to these works in clear 
breach of the copyright bargain.91 This was precisely the situation that the courts had to face in 
Fleischer, and for which they decided to resort to aesthetic functionality. 
 
The fact that the Fleischer courts were uncomfortable with the consequences of overlapping 
trademark and copyright protection in the Betty Boop character was engraved in the heart of the 
opinion in Fleischer I.  Here, the Ninth Circuit wrote that trademark protection in the character would 
create a perpetual monopoly and prevent Betty Boop from ever entering the public domain, which 
was contrary to the holding in Dastar.92 To prevent this from happening, the court held that the 
character was aesthetically functional.93 Since the current status of trademark law did not allow the 
court to deny trademark protection in the character based on a subject matter exclusion, the court thus 
found in aesthetic functionality a flexible doctrine to still permit A.V.E.L.A. (and others) to copy and 
use the Betty Boop character, in spite of the fact that the character was protected as a mark. Due to 
pressure from trademark owners, who vociferously argued that the court had stretched the Dastar 
ruling too far to include a work that was not officially in the public domain, the court ultimately 
scrapped Fleischer I and issued Fleischer II. In this opinion, the court did not mention Dastar.94  Still, 
                                                          
88 See Fleischer Studios Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). 
89 See, e.g., Irene Calboli, Trademarking Creative Works: Trends and Negative Effects on the Copyright Equilibrium, 
EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM: COPYRIGHT THIS CENTURY, forthcoming (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, eds. 2014). 
90 Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the owners of the purple 
child-friendly dinosaur Barney had valid trademark and copyright in the character); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm’t, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.N.J. 2003) (holding that copying Disney picture’s “previews” including Disney 
characters was trademark infringement). 
91 See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (D.C.N.Y. 1979) (finding that the character 
of Peter Rabbit could be protected as a trademark). 
92 Fleischer Studios Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011). 
93 Id. 
94 See discussion supra Part III. 
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the court again declared that, even though Fleischer had valid trademark rights in the image of Betty 
Boop, it could not enforce them against A.V.E.L.A. because the mark did not have secondary 
meaning.  In other words, the court maneuvered to still permit that the public and competitors could 
freely copy and use the character of Betty Boop also under Fleischer II.95 Concerns over overlapping 
rights continued to surface as well in the latest District Court decision where the court had to decide, 
on remand, on the word mark. Notably, the court explicitly stated the reasoning in Fleischer I was still 
applicable to the dispute and turned to aesthetic functionality to permit A.V.E.L.A. to use the name 
“Betty Boop,” arguing that otherwise A.V.E.L.A. could suffer a significant non-reputation 
disadvantage for not being able to market the products (that could be freely produced and distributed 
under Fleischer II) using the character’s name.96 
 
In summary, the Fleischer courts certainly wrote an important chapter in the interpretation of the 
doctrine of aesthetic functionality in the United States. After the decisions in Fleischer, it seems that 
courts could resort to the doctrine to set creative works free in the public domain after the expiration 
of the copyright term or when copyright protection does not apply, regardless of the additional layer 
of protection that these works have acquired as trademarks. Certainly, even after the Fleischer 
decisions and in light of other recent decisions, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality remains an 
unclear doctrine,97 particularly due to the fact that its application remains on a case-by-case basis—
what is “too pretty to be protected”?—which in turn makes the outcome of judicial decisions difficult 
to predict and potentially inconsistent.  Still, despite the doctrine’s imperfection, the possibility of 
resorting to aesthetic functionality remains a useful tool for the judiciary and for the trademark system 
as a whole, both as an applicable defense against claims of infringement ex post and as a deterrence 
factor against overreaching claims ex ante. Ultimately, despite trademark owners’ and trademark 
practitioners’ criticism, the resurrection of aesthetic functionality seems to have already resulted in 
some positive developments in trademark law, as also (perhaps involuntarily) acknowledged by 
professional publications. Notably, trademark owners across the United States are now attentively 
considering practitioners’ advice to use their marks as source identifiers and avoid claiming protection 
for (or at minimum not portraying their marks as) features that could be held important for market 
competition. To the contrary, trademark rights could be forfeited by claims of aesthetic 
functionality—the resurrecting “zombie apocalypse.” Perhaps the result of an imperfect doctrine, this 
return on the part of trademark owners to appreciating the fundamental principles that justify, and 
should continue to justify, trademark protection—namely that trademarks should be protected only 
insofar as they indicate commercial origin and not as aesthetic components of products per se—could 
be considered, on balance, a positive result for the trademark system. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Since its judicial appearance in Pagliero in 1952, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality has been 
controversial. After several decades of hiding and reappearing, courts have resorted with increasing 
                                                          
95 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2011). 
96 Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2012). The court also stated that, 
alternatively, the use of the mark was fair use. On the defense of descriptive fair use, see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006); 
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 
1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995). 
97 See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 7:81. 
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frequency to the doctrine in recent years, primarily as a counterweight against the expansion of 
trademark protection. Notably, in a society where trademark owners would likely trademark the “sun 
and the moon,”98 courts seems to have found in aesthetic functionality an imperfect, yet perhaps 
necessary, response to the obvious imbalances for important aspects of market competition that would 
otherwise be affected by overreaching trademark claims. As trademark owners are reflecting on recent 
judicial decisions and adapting their trademark strategies accordingly, only time will tell whether the 
courts will continue to resort to aesthetic functionality and to what specific extent. The decisions in 
Fleischer, however, have added an important twist to the interpretation of the doctrine in that the 
courts have indicated, first explicitly and then implicitly, that they are willing to resort to the doctrine 
to defend the copyright bargain against claims of trademark protection in creative works for which 
copyright protection had expired, or was not applicable. Even though the Ninth Circuit changed its 
actual wording from Fleischer I to Fleischer II, the idea that creative works should enter the public 
domain once copyright protection ends, or does not apply, was certainly crucial in the decisions. 
Ultimately, despite the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine, the resurrection of aesthetic functionality 
seems to have brought about some positive results. Trademark owners now weigh more carefully the 
risks of claiming protection, or attempting to enforce trademark rights, in product features for which 
protection should have been questionable from the start. Still, legal battles in this area will surely 
continue, and the Fleischer decisions, including Fleischer I, will represent important precedents for 
the courts to follow again in countering overreaching trademark claims and defending the copyright 
bargain against mutant copyrights in the forms of trademark protection. 
  
                                                          
98 Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 
(1948). 
